16 ideas
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
| 17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
| 17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
| 17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
| 17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
| 17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |