15 ideas
9616 | A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
15896 | Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |