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All the ideas for 'Mechanisms', 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers' and 'Real Essence'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
16030 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794 The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10786 Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
10788 Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799 Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790 Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
10791 Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
10787 Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
10789 Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796 If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797 Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17488 Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17493 Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
17487 Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
17489 Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17490 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
17491 Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
17494 Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]