15 ideas
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
| 17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
| 17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
| 17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
| 17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
| 17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
| 16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |
| 16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
| 16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |