16 ideas
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |