12 ideas
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
| 20643 | Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell] |
| 17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
| 17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
| 17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
| 17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
| 17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
| 17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |