Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mechanisms', 'Seven Quodlibets' and 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity'

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21 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
18529 Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
16779 Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16757 Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17488 Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17493 Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
17487 Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
17489 Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17490 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
17491 Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9102 If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
9114 There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
17494 Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
9115 To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham]