10 ideas
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| 22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
| 6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
| 17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
| 13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
| 20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |