11 ideas
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |