30 ideas
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |