Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity', 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions' and 'Political Philosophy: all that matters'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
World government needs a shared global identity [Oksala]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The principles Rawls arrives at do not just conform to benevolence, but also result from choices [Oksala]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Anarchists prefer local and communal government [Oksala]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism neglects responsibility, duties and rights [Oksala]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]