Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity', 'The Source of Necessity' and 'Plural Quantification'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
10633 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10638 A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10635 Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
10641 Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
10640 Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
10636 Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
10639 Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10643 We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
10637 Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12432 Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
12434 Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
12435 The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
12433 If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
12436 Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10634 Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]