Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity', 'Aspects of Scientific Explanation' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
23633 Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
22179 Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
6755 For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
17083 The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13052 Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
23630 Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
23629 The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
23632 Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]