57 ideas
| 8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| 19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
| 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
| 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| 19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
| 19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
| 19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
| 19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
| 19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
| 19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
| 19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
| 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
| 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
| 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
| 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
| 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
| 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
| 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
| 19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
| 19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
| 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
| 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
| 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
| 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
| 8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
| 8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
| 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
| 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
| 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
| 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
| 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
| 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
| 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
| 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
| 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
| 8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
| 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
| 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
| 4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
| 8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |
| 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
| 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |