23 ideas
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |