Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity', 'Truth-making and Correspondence' and 'A Matter of Principle'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365 If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362 Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360 It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355 What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18354 Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
18356 Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
18363 Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
18357 What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
18359 One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
18361 A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
18639 If we assess what people would buy in an imaginary insurance market, our taxes could copy it [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]