Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Time Without Change', 'Draft Statement of Human Obligations' and 'On What There Is'

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47 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker]
We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe]
If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil]