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All the ideas for 'Dialectic of Enlightenment', 'What Required for Foundation for Maths?' and 'Logical Necessity'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
15663 Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
17774 Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
17773 Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17795 Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry]
17796 There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
17800 The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
17801 The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
17803 Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
17786 The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
17788 First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
17791 Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
17787 Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17790 No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17779 'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry]
17778 Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry]
17780 'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17789 No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
17784 Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
17782 Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry]
17781 Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17799 Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry]
17797 Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17775 If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry]
17776 The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry]
17777 Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry]
17804 Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17792 1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17793 It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17794 Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry]
17802 We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry]
17805 Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
17785 Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20572 De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer]