27 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |