15 ideas
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
| 12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
| 12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
| 12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
| 12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
| 12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
| 12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
| 12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
| 12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |