Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Dispositions and Powers' and 'Alfred Tarski: life and logic'

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28 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10147 The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman]
10148 Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman]
10149 Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman]
10150 The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman]
10146 Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10158 A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman]
10162 Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10160 Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman]
10159 Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10161 If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
10156 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman]
10155 Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
23708 Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
23709 Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
23707 Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23714 Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
23711 A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23712 Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
23698 Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23699 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23700 A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23701 A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23702 A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23703 Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23704 We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
23710 Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
23706 Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
5994 Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]