72 ideas
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |