13 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |