25 ideas
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |