13 ideas
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 16660 | Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
| 16626 | Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus] |
| 5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |