Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction'' and 'Against Structural Universals'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]