Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Semantic Relationism' and 'Reason, Truth and History'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]