49 ideas
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |