Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Classical Cosmology (frags)', 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' and 'Critique of Practical Reason'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


50 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant]
The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant]
Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant]
Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant]
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant]
Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant]
From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant]