15 ideas
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |