20 ideas
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |