13 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
| 5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |