12 ideas
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 5994 | Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG] |