Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]