20 ideas
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
21899 | There is no being beyond becoming [Deleuze] |
16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |