17 ideas
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |