19 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |