Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Logicism Revisited' and 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10061 The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
10065 Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10049 Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
10050 A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10058 No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10062 Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
10063 Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]