15 ideas
| 20349 | Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson] |
| 20351 | Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson] |
| 20350 | Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 20356 | Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson] |
| 20366 | A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson] |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |