25 ideas
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |