Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Alfred Tarski: life and logic' and 'Four Dimensionalism'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
14721 Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10147 The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman]
10148 Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman]
10149 Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman]
10150 The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman]
10146 Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10158 A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman]
10162 Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10160 Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman]
10159 Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10161 If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
10156 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman]
10155 Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
14760 Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14745 If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14740 If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14752 Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14743 The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
14747 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
14757 Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
14727 Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
14738 Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14726 Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
14728 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
14729 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
14730 Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
14731 Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
14758 How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
14762 Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
14741 The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14754 If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
14763 Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
14725 Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
14735 Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
14722 Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14756 For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider]
14724 Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
14723 Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
14736 The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
14734 The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]