18 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |