Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Ontological Categories' and 'Truthmaking for Presentists'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


25 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]