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All the ideas for 'works', 'Psychosemantics' and 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)'

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56 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor]
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor]
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]