32 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |