Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Philosophical Investigations' and 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

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82 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein]