57 ideas
| 16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
| 16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
| 16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
| 16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
| 16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
| 9912 | There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf] |
| 9901 | Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf] |
| 9151 | Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K] |
| 13891 | To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C] |
| 17904 | A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf] |
| 17906 | To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf] |
| 9898 | We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf] |
| 17903 | Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf] |
| 9897 | The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf] |
| 9900 | For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf] |
| 9899 | The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf] |
| 8697 | Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend] |
| 8304 | No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe] |
| 9906 | If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf] |
| 9907 | If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf] |
| 9908 | The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf] |
| 9909 | The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf] |
| 9911 | Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf] |
| 8925 | Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf] |
| 9938 | How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam] |
| 9910 | Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf] |
| 9903 | Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf] |
| 9904 | The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf] |
| 16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
| 16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
| 16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
| 16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
| 16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
| 16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
| 16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
| 16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
| 16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
| 9905 | Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf] |
| 16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
| 16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
| 16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
| 16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
| 16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
| 16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
| 16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
| 16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
| 16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
| 16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
| 16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
| 16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
| 16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
| 16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
| 16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
| 16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
| 16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |
| 16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
| 6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |