Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Interview with Philippa Foot' and 'Ontology'

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33 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
7689 The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
7681 Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
7682 Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
7697 On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
7701 Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
7707 To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
7692 Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
7687 Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
7679 Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
7678 Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
7683 Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
7684 Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
7703 If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
7685 An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
7699 Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
7688 The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
7695 Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
7694 We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7706 If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7704 Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
23438 Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
7702 The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431 Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
23432 Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
23433 Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
23434 There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
23439 Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435 If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]