56 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |