17 ideas
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |